This thesis assesses the viability of applying dissuasion towards the development of offensive counter space (OCS) systems by China. As a relatively new defense policy and certainly one that has never been explicitly applied previously, this thesis delves into the characteristics prescribed by recent U.S. planning documents to develop a strategy that more appropriately addresses the current security concerns. Implicitly, dissuasion is intended to prevent future arms races with China through well-placed U.S. actions that channel adversary efforts in a direction desired by Washington. Several things become clear during this investigation. First, very little scholarly work exists discussing the concept of dissuasion and the mechanisms used to formulate, implement, and execute it as a defense policy. Second, that while an admirable attempt to lessen the need for more costly policy options such as deterrence and defeat, dissuasion will not prevent China from developing counter space weapons, especially since ground-based jammers that target satellite links have already proven effective. Third, the best chance of dissuading China's efforts to acquire space-based OCS systems is through international treaties and laws.

Adapted from the author's Naval Postgraduate School thesis. "August 2005".

Foreword -- Executive summary -- Introduction -- Dissuasion -- Space operations in a Sino-American conflict -- Conditions for success -- Conclusion.